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“I see the most serious fault of our past policy formulation to lie in something that I 
might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems…It has in it 
something of the old emphasis on arbitration treaties… and schemes for universal 
disarmament, something of the more ambitious American concepts of the role of 
international law, something of the League of Nations and the United 
Nations,…something of the idea of a universal “Article 51” past, something of the 
belief in World Law and World Government. But it is none of this entirely…It is the 
belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of 
governments in the international field by the acceptance of some system of legal rules 
and restraints”  
 
 
   George F. Kennan 
1
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Our postwar institutions were built for an international world, but we now live in a 
global world. Responding effectively to this shift is the core institutional challenge.  
 
 
     Kofi Annan 
2
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 American Diplomacy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951, pgs 82,83 
 
2 The Role of the United Nations in the 21st century, Millennium Summit Report 2000, New York, pg11 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 A Brief Overview 
 
The Security Council is the organ of the United Nations with the power to determine, 
in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and to make recommendations, or decide 
what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.  
 
In discharging such a paramount responsibility the Security Council has expanded its 
powers and prerogatives. This process has been generally accepted as it concerns the 
first main purpose of the United Nations, according to Article 1 (1) of its Charter: ―to 
maintain international peace and security‖. 
 
However, as the Security Council expands its competence through practice, cases of 
abuses of powers raise concern about the deficit of legitimacy and representation in 
that principal organ of the United Nations and affect the rule of law in international 
relations. 
  
The thesis addresses the essential question of how to strengthen the rule of law within 
a horizontal and fragmented structure of international relations with a view to making 
it in tune with the political evolution of nation-states towards a more democratic 
representation of States in a globalized and interconnected world. 
 
 
1.2  The Structure of the thesis 
 
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the legitimacy of the expanding powers of 
the Security Council as an international legislator, adjudicator and enforcer. It will 
also aim at discussing whether such hypertrophy serves the purpose of strengthening 
the rule of law endeavoured in the United Nations Millennium Declaration.  
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Due to its focus on Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, the paper will address the 
widening notion of what may constitute a threat to international peace and security in 
the absence of a legal definition of this important concept, which leaves an extremely 
wide discretion to the Security Council. 
 
The paper raises the question of whether there is a line to be drawn between those 
Security Council decisions which it is proper for it to take as part of its activity 
directed to the immediate restoration of peace and those that go beyond that function 
by making legal determinations that are of a legislative or judicial nature.  
 
The thesis deals with a matter of principle related to the legitimacy of the functioning 
of the main political body of the United Nations, and the legality of the decisions 
taken, when it acts as a Court of Law, determining what conduct is lawful, if legal 
prescriptions are null, what behaviour to be criminalized and what specific laws to be 
enacted.  
 
As the Council acts as a legislature then the question of the representation within that 
organ becomes more pertinent and the notion of legitimate powers and consent, of 
democracy and checks and balances to ensure transparency, accountability and 
prevent abuses of power.   
 
In fact, the Security Council is supreme in the hierarchy of international organisations. 
No other institution can overrule its determinations and there is no judicial review for 
the mandatory decisions it takes under Chapter Seven. 
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The relevance and opportunity of this thesis are enhanced by the dimension of the 
changes and challenges humankind has been facing since the end of the Cold War and 
the degree of uncertainty about the shape of democracy, political representation and 
the rule of law in national and in international affairs.  
 
As the scope of ―security‖ reflects a growing linkage between peace, security and 
development, ideals of justice, ethics and morals have started to take front seat in 
international society against a background of a decade of failed unilateralism, political 
arrogance and a threat to civil liberties on the part of major powers. 
 
 
1.3. Sources and Methodology 
 
This thesis will use legal, factual as well as political science and political philosophy 
sources. 
 
The legal sources are mainly the ―The United Nations Charter‖, as well as charters, 
resolutions, customs, declarations of the United Nations and other international bodies 
and organizations. Other sources are legal literature by distinguished scholars, of 
which many have worked to advance the role of law in international relations and to 
promote improvement in the machinery of international justice. Information has also 
been collected from the web sites of the United Nations and the International Court of 
Justice. 
 
One of the main doctrinary sources used is Norberto Bobbio, philosopher of law and 
political sciences, also considered a historian of political thought.  In an Age of Rights 
how relevant should international law be to the conduct of international relations and 
foreign policy, as states review their global interests and security paradigm in the 21
st 
century?  The thesis finds also inspiration in classical texts of political philosophy 
such as Immanuel Kant‘s 1795 treatise Perpetual Peace, according to which peace 
can only be achieved and secured by increasing the importance of the rule of law in 
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relations between states and its focus on the role of citizenship. Kant‘s emphasis on a 
federation of states able, in cooperation with individual states and their citizens, to 
take responsibility for preserving the law, would represent a crucial protection against 
despotism. In that same vein, Jurgen Habermas‘ 1992, Between Facts and Norms, 
adds to the philosophical debate involving law, politics and democracy. Its pertinence 
lies also in the fact that his discourse recasts the Kantian ―cosmopolitan project‖ as a 
―constitutionalization of international law‖.   
 
As for the methodology, the thesis is based both on comparative concepts pertaining 
to national and international legal orders as well as historical analysis of international 
relations and political science and political philosophy research material. The recourse 
to this multidisciplinary approach is necessary to assess the relationship between 
international public law and international politics and the extent to which a more 
legally grounded global community contributes to stability and legitimacy in 
international relations.  
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Chapter I 
Strengthening the rule of law 
 
During the four decades that followed the Second World War, nuclear deterrence may 
have prevented a global catastrophe, despite the peripheral conflicts, which 
challenged the ban on the use of force adopted by the United Nations. The Cold War 
was a reminder that relative peace on a global scale depended not on the rule of law 
but on the balance of power, not on the principle of universal respect for human rights 
and individual freedoms but rather on the notion that might would continue to make 
right.  
 
That international structure could be considered successful as it avoided another 
major military conflict for almost half a century, a lengthy historic period when 
compared with the twenty years interval between the First and the Second World 
Wars. The failure of the international system conceived by the League of Nations has 
been attributed to a rigid institutional model created in the belief that a law-based 
international system could ensure peace and stability.  
 
The system of collective security adopted by the United Nations Charter was founded 
on that same idea but with significant improvements. This time the establishment of 
norms of conduct was accompanied by institutional structures for peace enforcement 
and the peaceful settlement of international conflicts. The ideological dispute between 
the Superpowers would hamper the functioning of the system. With the collapse of 
the former Soviet Union, prospects emerged for a new international order founded on 
the rule of law and not on the fear of mutually assured destruction by military means.  
 
After initially following the path of multilateralism and international cooperation in 
dealing with the invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the United States of America changed 
course and, inspired by its hegemonic position in the world, took the path of 
unilateralism, a tendency exacerbated after the September 11 attack and the President 
of the United States‘ declaration of ―war on terrorism‖ (―Our grief has turned to 
anger, and anger to resolution.  Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring 
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justice to our enemies, justice will be done‖)3. Once again the eclipse of international 
law‘s relevance in dealing with world problems would reflect the dominance of the 
realist paradigm in international affairs enhanced this time by neo-conservatism belief 
that unilateralism would ensure quicker results.  
 
No matter the circumstances and expectations after the Cold War, the revitalization of 
the collective security system established under the Charter did not happen. The 
efforts made by the international community to strengthen the United Nations and 
maintain international peace and security in face of the invasion of Kuwait have failed 
to inaugurate a new paradigm for the conduct of international relations. A decade 
afterwards, at the turn of a century in which the military expenditures had far 
outpaced the investments in peace, the UN Millennium Declaration showed how the 
international community perceived the global predicaments. 
 
On 18 September 2000, at the United Nations, in New York, heads of State and 
Government of 181 countries signed the Millennium Declaration
4
, a document that 
represents a broad commitment to mobilize all countries to tackle the main challenges 
for humankind at the dawn of a new century.  
 
The document considers certain fundamental values to be essential to international 
relations in the XXI century and acknowledges as the first among them ―Freedom‖, 
which is introduced together with the following explanation: “Men and women have 
the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and 
from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice. Democratic and participatory 
governance based on the will of the people best assures these rights”.5 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 U.S. President George W. Bush's address to a joint session of Congress and the nation on 20 September 2001, 
Washington DC.  
 
4 The Declaration was adopted on 18 September 2000 by the General Assembly as Resolution 55/2 (UN – doc: 
A/RES/55/2), at the Fifty-fifth session, under Agenda item 60 (b). 
 
5 Ibid paragraph 6. 
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Within the Millennium Declaration, the Heads of State and Government decided that 
the first step to promote freedom and other fundamental values was: ―To strengthen 
respect for the rule of law in international as in national affairs…”.6  
 
The rule of law constitutes a fundamental component of democratic society. It is 
generally defined as the principle according to which all members of society - both 
citizens and rulers - are bound by a set of clearly defined and universally accepted 
laws. In a democracy, it is widely recognized that the rule of law is manifested in an 
independent judiciary, a free press and a system of checks and balances on leaders 
through free elections and separation of powers among the branches of government. 
The legitimate powers of the government should derive from the consent of the 
governed. 
 
Since Hammurabi‘s Code of Laws, the Ten Commandments of the Hebrew, the 
Chinese, Hindu and Muslim Laws, the Roman Law and the Napoleonic Code up to 
what it is today the civil and the common law systems, the discipline and protection of 
the individuals within communities and societies have been a precondition of their 
survival as a civilization. As the old Latin aphorism says: ―Ubi societas, ibi jus‖ (if 
there is a society, law will be there). Every community generates its own individual 
system of law, and only when such a system of law is in fact substantially just and 
effective is the community able to function.   
 
The same would apply to international society in a shrinking world, in which 
individual nation-states are more and more interconnected and interdependent and the 
protection of human rights has become a universal moral and legal imperative. 
Interdependence means that nation-states are more affected by external circumstance 
and decisions. Trade, investments, finance and the environment are globally related 
and are becoming the subject of multilateral regulation, as it also happens with 
immigration and trans-boundary movement of people. 
 
                                                 
6 Ibid paragraph 9 
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Due to the world‘s demography and environment, its cultural diversities and current 
predicaments, as well as to a growing perception of a common fate for humankind, 
the strengthening of the rule of law in national as well as in international relations 
might give the measure of success or failure of a global civilization in the 21
st
 century.  
 
According to the Millennium Declaration: Democratic and participatory governance 
best assures the right to live in dignity, free from hunger and from the fear of 
violence, oppression or injustice.
7
 Political representation and participation are 
essential elements to guarantee that ―the strengthening of the rule of law‖ serves the 
entire international community and enhances the legitimacy of international 
institutions. 
 
Indeed, the principle of democracy is now universal and one of the greatest challenges 
for humankind in this new millennium will be the struggle to make the practice of 
democracy equally universal.    
 
Exercised with extreme vigor during the present decade by major powers, the 
unilateralist trend may have eroded the rule of law and weakened international 
institutions. Unilateralism still threatens the consolidation of a multilateral system, 
which better translates the interests of the whole international community and reflects 
the consensus building efforts necessary to the formation of, and particularly respect 
for legal rules of universal application. 
 
One of the most important transformations in international law through the twentieth 
century was the shift from predominantly bilateral treaty relations to multilateral 
institutional relations. This path should proceed and be enhanced, on a multilateral 
basis. In the Millennium Declaration, the Heads of State reaffirmed their faith in the 
Organization of the United Nations and its Charter as indispensable foundations of a 
more peaceful, prosperous and just world. They also reaffirmed their commitment to 
the purposes and principles of the Charter, ―which have proved timeless and 
universal‖.8  
                                                 
7 Ibid paragraph 6 
 
8 Ibid paragraph 1 
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Negotiated by 51 member countries and adopted in 1945, the Charter of the United 
Nations is the foundation of a multilateral system which now encompasses 192 
members, almost four times more than the original ones. In his address to the General 
Assembly in September 2003, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned 
Member States that the organization had ―reached a fork in the road. It could rise to 
the challenge of meeting new threats or it could risk erosion in the face of mounting 
discord between States and unilateral action by them”.9  
 
Today multilateralism represents collective deliberation and reflects democratic 
values and principles, as it serves the international community, limiting special 
interests and focusing on common interests of a pluralistic society of nation states. 
 
Democratisation of the international community should gradually reduce some 
fundamental differences between national and international legal orders. In the first, 
individuals are the main subjects of a broad and well-established system of domestic 
laws, while, in the second, States are the principal actors of an expanding but still 
embryonic system of international rules and institutions.  
 
As States are sovereign, international jurisdiction depends on their consent as parties. 
Despite widening breaches of this general rule, there is no formal global authority or a 
centralized power system in the international community similar to the one, which 
prevails within nation-states.  
 
However, in the most sensitive area of international concern, international peace and 
security, States have acquiesced in 1945 that some international organs assume an 
extraordinary degree of compulsory jurisdiction. This is the case of the United 
Nations Security Council, whose Permanent Members, against whom no action can be 
taken without their consent, were granted by the United Nations Charter the power to 
identify the existence of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of 
                                                 
9 UN Secretary General Statements, The Secretary General Address to the General Assembly, New York, 23 
September 2003  
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aggression, as well as to determine what measures should be taken by States to restore 
international peace.  
 
No organ within any domestic legal framework parallels this international instrument 
of collective peace keeping. No legislature and no judiciary perform such a task. The 
executive branch might have this dual function of identifying the breach of the law 
and reacting to it. However, such a reaction is not, or is not meant to be, 
predominantly influenced by political factors. Moreover, it is subject to judicial 
control, at least within democratic states. 
 
On the international scene, a different situation exists. The Security Council is not 
subject to any judicial control that can be invoked at the instance of a party against 
which it directs its political reaction. In fact, under international law no institution has 
a formal power of judicial review over an action of the political organ of the United 
Nations, not even the International Court of Justice. 
 
This situation becomes worrisome as the Council‘s powers grow exponentially 
through practice, without any change of the UN Charter. In fact, after the Cold War 
years, the Security Council‘s role has expanded indiscriminately in delimiting 
borders, establishing international criminal tribunals, governing territory, and passing 
laws of general application on terrorism and nuclear proliferation.
10
  
 
Despite growing interdependence among States, the idea of global governance is still 
considered by most analysts as a utopia, even if defined as ―a premature truth‖.  
Realistically, international community should remain largely horizontal, based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of States, whose deep roots reach the 17
th
 century 
with the Peace of Westphalia. Yet the legitimacy of the current international order 
based on the United Nations Charter will increasingly depend on its capacity to be 
more representative and more accountable for its decisions.  
 
                                                 
10 Security Council Resolutions 773 (1992), 833 (1993), 955 (1994), 1272 (1999), 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004), inter 
alia.  
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The structure of international community continues to be decentralized, in an incipient 
stage of evolution. Advancements in modern political and social thinking have 
gradually brought humankind to the Age of Rights, to use Bobbio‘s expression11, but 
with still fragmented institutions to enforce them. The International Criminal Court is 
an example of this inexorable but partial expansion of the rule of law. 
 
Indeed, the challenge to strengthen the rule of law as envisaged by the Millennium 
Declaration is how to improve this horizontal and fragmented structure of 
international relations to make it more in tune with the political evolution of nation-
states towards a more democratic and participatory representation of their peoples 
taking into account their historic, cultural and religious differences. 
 
It is widely accepted today that the recognition and protection of human rights are the 
foundation of modern democratic institutions. Human rights, democracy and peace 
represent the three essential components of the same historic movement. According to 
Bobbio: ―if human rights are not recognized and protected, there is no democracy, and 
without democracy, the minimal conditions for a peaceful resolution of conflicts do 
not exist‖.12 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights already stated that 
―...recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world‖.13  
 
So far, in international relations there is no system of legal rules to ensure the same 
degree of transparency in the decision making process, which exists within domestic 
jurisdiction, to prevent abuses and arbitrary acts by individual States or international 
organizations concerning peace and security. The administration of justice outside 
national jurisdiction is still precarious.  
  
                                                 
11 Bobbio, Norberto, The Age of Rights, Polity Press, 1996, first published in Italy as L’Età dei Diritti, Giulio 
Einaudi, 1990.  
 
12 Ibid, vii, Preface to the English Edition.  
 
13 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 
December 1948, Preamble, paragraph 1, United Nations documents. 
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Many argue that we are living in an era of historical transition – one of those periods 
of rapid change in society and in the institutions as well as in the process by which it 
is governed. It may seem still far too early to have a clear understanding of the main 
trends and directions of the changes that lie ahead. If the evolution of nation states is a 
parameter, the millennium may witness the fragmentation of international power and 
the emergence of those same rights and values of liberal democracy and 
representation on a universal scale.  
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    Chapter II 
    Abuses of power in national and international jurisdictions: a 
paradox  
 
In 1215, the King of England signed the Magna Carta
14
 inaugurating a constitutional 
tradition of recognition and representation of rights, which is in the origin of early 
parliamentary democracy. From the 17
th
 to the 19
th
 centuries, in England and in 
France, philosophers of the ―Age of Reason‖ proclaimed the idea that governments 
should be created to serve the people and not vice-versa. In opposition to the ―divine 
right of kings‖, John Locke insisted on ―an established, settled, known law‖ to which 
even kings are subject, ―a known and indifferent judge‖ with ―power to back and 
support the sentence when right‖ and a ―supreme‖ legislative power elected by the 
people, but bound itself by standing laws and authorized judges.
15
 Together with Jean 
Jacques Rousseau‘s ―Social Contract‖ (1762), these ideas of ―freedom‖ and 
―equality‖ under the law became basic tenets of democracy.16  
 
In democratic societies, a regime of separation of powers (legislative, executive and 
judiciary) provides checks and balances among these different autonomous branches 
of the State. Both the wide political representation of the people and the system of 
division of competences within the national government seek to ensure individual 
rights against abuses of power and arbitrary excesses by the State. Within national 
systems, States enact constitutions or basic laws establishing the fundamental 
principles to regulate rights and obligations, which the State enforces inside its 
borders, where national jurisdiction is respected and internationally recognized.  
                                                 
14 King John of England agreed, in 1215, to the demands of his barons through the Magna Carta, which grants "to 
all freemen of our kingdom" the rights and liberties the great charter described. It is one of the earliest 
expressions of the rule of law and influenced the development of the common law and constitutional documents. 
 
15 Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al., 1764). Chapter: 
CHAP. IX. Of the Ends of Political Society and Government, paragraphs 124, 125 and 126. 
 
16 Rousseau, Jean Jacques. The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, 1762, Translated by G. D. H. 
Cole. In its chapter on the right of the strongest, he sustains that: “force does not create right, and that we are 
obliged to obey only legitimate powers”. On the subsequent chapter on slavery, he proceeds by arguing that: 
“Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no right, we must conclude that 
conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among men”.  
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In the world scene, international law has not yet evolved towards a similar system of 
wider political representation of States and judicial review of international decisions 
to safeguard States´ rights against abuses and arbitrary excesses by other members of 
the community of nations. States remain the principal actors in the global arena and 
their agreement is necessary for subjecting them to international adjudication. Despite 
the advancements in the evolution of public international law in areas such as 
representation (concept of sovereign equality of States), peaceful settlement of 
disputes, prohibition of the threat or use of force and collective enforcement resulting 
from the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, consent by the State, remains, 
in general, a condition for jurisdiction.  
 
The International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction unless the parties have 
specifically agreed thereto either through a treaty or by accepting the Optional Clause 
in appropriate terms.
17
 Every other tribunal, whether specifically created or 
institutional, is likewise dependent upon the consent of the parties with a few 
exceptions such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). They are both ad 
hoc courts established, respectivelly, by the Security Council Resolutions 827 (93) 
and 955 (94) under Chapter VII. It was disputed then if the creation of a tribunal can 
be considered a measure to maintain or restore peace and security, as foreseen in the 
United Nations Charter, or if the Security Council had overstreched its powers. The 
question would be solved when, as a result of a process initiated by the UN General 
Assembly, the Rome Statute entered into force in July 2002. The International 
Criminal Court became the first permanent, treaty based, tribunal established to help 
                                                 
17  According to Article 36 of ICJ Statutes: “1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties 
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions 
in force. 2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso 
facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction 
of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; 
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the 
nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.  3. The declarations 
referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain 
states, or for a certain time.  4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court. 5. 
Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and which are 
still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance with 
their terms. 6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the 
decision of the Court.” 
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end impunity for perpetrators of the most serious crimes. As an independent 
international organization, not part of the United Nations, the ICC is the instrument 
for addressing responsibilily for those crimes outside national jurisdiction.  
 
Thus, as a general rule, the jurisdiction of international courts and the application of 
international treaties would require State‘s consent to acquiesce with the adjudication 
of the specific tribunal or the signature and ratification of a treaty. Otherwise, the 
State would not be bound by the rules of that treaty nor will it be subject to the 
jurisdiction of that court.  
 
However, State compliance on decisions of the Security Council taken under Chapter 
Seven of the United Nations Charter is mandatory to all member states. If these 
Resolutions acquire a quasi-judicial or judicial character, if they are perceived as an 
instrument to enhance a deficit of representation in the decisions on the most serious 
matters, then the legitimacy and fundamental legal basis for such actions should be 
subject to further scrutiny.  
 
One may argue that the consent given by signing the Charter is so distant from the 
occasion on which it becomes relevant that the very significance of consent could be 
at risk. In fact, when the Security Council decides to take actions with respect to 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, that Resolution 
must be universally observed and enforced.  
 
Composed of five Permanent Members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom 
and the United States) and ten non-permanent members, with a two-year mandate, the 
Security Council acts on behalf of the whole international community as the main 
political organ of the United Nations with the highest hierarchy within the 
organization.
18
  
 
Once a decision is taken by the Security Council under Chapter Seven, it must be 
observed by all Member States
19
 and when necessary, enacted as law. This means that 
                                                 
18 Article 23 of the United Nations Charter. 
 
19 According to Article 25 of the UN Charter, “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”. 
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the Executive, the Parliament and the Judiciary of non-member States of the Security 
Council took no part in the discussion of said Resolution, which will become, 
nonetheless, in such States a source of legal obligations, as well as of political 
decisions on the matter.  
 
Chapter Seven deals with ―actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the 
peace and acts of aggression‖ and Article 39 states that: ―the Security Council shall 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be 
taken…to maintain or restore international peace and security‖.  
 
Decisions adopted by the Security Council are mandatory for all States, as established 
by Article 25. By signing and ratifying the Charter, UN Member States agree to 
accept and enforce them.  That obligation is further stressed in Article 48: ― 1. The 
action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance 
of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United 
Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine. 2. Such 
decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and 
through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are 
members”.  
 
Besides representing the core of the most important organ of the United Nations, for 
its responsibility on maintaining international peace and security, the Council‘s five 
permanent members can veto any decision of the Council. Such a right is not 
explicitly mentioned in the Charter, but it is a consequence of Article 27 (3): 
―Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an 
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent 
members...‖. Accordingly, any of the five Permanent Members can block decisions on 
substantive matters, that is to say, on all matters that are not of mere procedural 
nature. 
 
On the one hand, because of that extraordinary degree of compulsory jurisdiction 
conferred to it by the Charter, Security Council‘s decisions on threats to international 
peace are, as explained, universally bound. On the other hand, as a prerogative of the 
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veto power, the Five Permanent Members are the only States to have a license to 
escape compulsory jurisdiction by the possibility of choosing the cases they are 
willing to acquiesce and of rejecting those others they object being considered by the 
Council.  
 
This situation represents in itself a departure from the principle of the sovereign 
equality of States and consecrates a system in which some states are, indeed, more 
sovereign than others. At that time, it could be argued that it was the price to be paid 
by the international community to those States, which played an important role in the 
outcome of the Second World War and in the multilateral system that emerged 
afterwards. However, from the perspective of the beginning of the 21
st
 century, it is 
not at all certain that this perception should indefinitely endure in face of the same 
powerful principles and values which inspired the struggle against Nazism, Fascism 
and other totalitarian regimes.  
 
Whenever the decisions of the Security Council on Chapter Seven, or the lack of 
decisions thereof, seem not to reflect the principles and the letter of the Charter but 
rather the selective political interests of its permanent members the deficit of 
representation in the main political organ of the United Nation and the lack of judicial 
review become a reason for legitimate concern. What are the consequences of the 
hypertrophy of the Council‘s power and does it contribute to strengthen the rule of 
law in international relations?  
   
The Security Council accumulates the prerogative of defining and identifying the 
breach as well as of reacting against it on political ground. The Council already has an 
extraordinary power, as the organ responsible for international collective security, 
without any judicial control that can be invoked at the instance of a party against 
which it directs its political reaction, be it a State or an individual. 
   
The Algerian War, Northern Ireland, Tibet, Vietnam and Chechnya are historically 
some of the international armed conflicts that do not figure in the record of 
Resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter 7 of the Charter. Yet, they 
correspond to similar situations which have been, otherwise, considered by the 
Council as threats to peace and security.  
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During the Cold War, the veto has always loomed over the work of the UN Security 
Council. The United States and the Soviet Union often evoked their prerogative. 
Overall, the five permanent members cast 199 vetoes between 1946 and 1989, 
preventing the Council from taking action on many important cases.
20
 After the Cold 
War, despite a reduction of the use of veto by the Permanent Members, the Council 
continued to avoid discussing crises that one of the Five Permanent Members 
considers to be within its own exclusive sphere of interest.
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The selective choice of situations and conflicts enhances the search for greater 
legitimacy in the decision making power of the Security Council. The record of the 
Security Council and the unilateral actions of some Permanent Members might be 
perceived as not in tune with the objective of transparency and accountability. 
 
In a power fragmented shrinking world, international order has to be founded on 
common principles, values and legitimised by a wider political representation. This 
order cannot be based on military force alone, but on the capacity of inspiring 
collective action to pursue the objectives enshrined in the United Nations Charter, as 
well as in those prescribed by the Millennium Declaration to strengthen the rule of 
law and democracy in both national and international affairs.  
 
To remain legitimate, international order in the 21
st
 century must not only be accepted 
by major powers, but will have to be efficient in answering to important ethical and 
moral issues in the global agenda, such as the ones related to poverty, health and 
sustainable development, as well as other Millennium Development Goals, capable of 
inspiring, mobilising and uniting the whole international community. The same would 
apply to a higher sense of justice in the manner that international decisions are taken, 
moreover by the Security Council.  
 
                                                 
20 Monitoring Policy Making in the United Nations, Subjects of UN Security Council Vetoes, Global Policy Forum, 
New York, 2004. presents a table with all vetoes from 1945 to 2008, based on data from the United Nations 
(www.globalpolicy.org). 
 
21 Bailey, Sydney and Daws, Sam, "The Procedure of the UN Security Council", 3rd Edition, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1998.  
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International politics should be increasingly based upon legal prescriptions, which 
establishes the limits, discipline and scope of political action. Addressing the dilemma 
between power and law in the end of the 20
th
 century, Oscar Schachter, former legal 
advisor to the Secretary General of the United Nations and Professor of the University 
of Columbia in New York, argued that
22
 ―since we cannot deny the crucial role of 
power in the relations of States, we should seek to understand the specific impact on 
the international legal system. Plainly, international law is not an ideal construct, 
created and given effect solely in terms of its internal logic. Nor can it be understood 
only as an instrument to serve human needs and aims (though it is that too). 
International law must also be seen as the product of historical experience in which 
power and the relation of forces are determinants. Those States with power (i.e., the 
ability to control the outcomes contested by others) will have a disproportionate and 
often decisive influence in determining the content of rules and their application in 
practice. Because this is the case, international law, in a broad sense, both reflects and 
sustains the existing political order and distributions of power‖. 
 
Professor Schachter follows on by asking: ―Are powerful States therefore above the 
law? Does their power mean not only that they have a substantial influence on the 
formation of rules and obligations but that they also have sufficient ability to control 
the outcome contested by others as to enable them to violate the law when it is in their 
interest to do so?‖ 
 
The former UN Legal Counsel tries to answer that critical dilemma by saying that this 
would be a misleading conclusion about the realities of law observance in 
international society.
23
  But those questions remain valid and a reminder of the 
challenges facing the international community to strengthen the rule of law and the 
democratic principles, as envisaged in the Millennium Declaration.  
 
 
  
                                                 
22 Schachter, Oscar, International Law in Theory and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 
Netherlands, 1991, pg 6. 
23 Ibid pg 7 
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        Chapter III 
International law in a more democratic world 
 
 
 In his classical book American Diplomacy, George Kennan, in the chapter 
dedicated to the war with Spain, explains the imperial phase in United States‘ history 
during the 19
th
 century: 
 
―The opponents of expansionism argued partly in legal terms, challenging the 
constitutionality of such arrangements. But their most powerful arguments were those 
which asked by what right we Americans, who had brought our country into existence 
on the thesis that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the 
governed, could assume the rights of empire over other peoples and accept them into 
our system, regardless of their own feelings, as subjects rather than as citizens‖. 
 
He proceeds by quoting the Senator Hoar of Massachusetts during the debate over the 
ratification of the Peace Treaty with Spain: ―To annex foreign territory and govern it 
without the consent of its populations would be utterly contrary to the sacred 
principles of the Declaration of Independence and unconstitutional because it 
promoted no purpose of the Constitution. The Founding Fathers had never thought 
that their descendants would be beguiled from these sacred and awful verities that 
they might strut about in the cast off clothing of pinchbeck emperors and pewter 
kings; that their descendants would be excited by the smell of gun powder and the 
sound of guns of a single victory as a small boy by a firecracker on some Fourth of 
July morning‖.24  
 
Nowadays, the principle of consent of the governed is widely recognized. It would be 
a paradox – and would deprive it of any consequence - if the principle would have no 
bearing in international relations in a world that becomes ever more interdependent 
and global.   
 
                                                 
24 Kennan George F., American Diplomacy 1900-1950, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951, pg19   
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The Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, states in its Article 21 that:  
 
―(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
                    directly or  through freely chosen representatives;  
  (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country; 
  (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; 
        this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which 
                    shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
                    vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.‖ 
 
In the last sixty years, the right of all people to take part in the government of their 
country through free and regular elections has become generally accepted and upheld. 
People of all cultures value their freedom of choice, and feel the need to have a say in 
decisions affecting their lives. Yet, the ―world of democracies‖ is not a democratic 
world. Democratic principles are still to be applied and recognized within the 
international community. 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, then Secretary 
General of the United Nations Kofi Annan declared that: ―one of the greatest 
challenges of humankind in the new century will be the struggle to make the practice 
of democracy equally universal.‖25  
 
Indeed, ―in an era in which the fates of peoples are deeply intertwined, democracy has 
to be recast and strengthened, both within pre-established borders and across them‖.26           
 
Under the conditions and circumstances prevailing in this first decade of the 21
st
 
century, broader participation and representation in world decision making has 
become a contingency of the changes in international politics with the emergence of a 
different scenario from the one which characterized the previous century.  
 
In 2005, the Secretary General of the United Nations presented a five-year progress 
report on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration, which he called  “In 
                                                 
25 Kofi Annan's Closing Remarks to the Ministerial Warsaw, Poland, June 27, 2000. 
26 Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, pg x. 
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Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security And Human Rights For All‖. In 
introducing the Report, he stressed that these three interconnected goals - 
development, security and human rights -  ―must be underpinned by the rule of law‖ 
and should go hand in hand.
27
   
 
According to the Report: ―in a world of inter-connected threats and opportunities, it is 
in each country's self-interest that all of these challenges are addressed 
effectively. The cause of larger freedom can only be advanced if nations work 
together; and the United Nations can only help if it is remoulded as an effective 
instrument of their common purpose‖. 
 
The Report also recognizes that ―there is a yearning in many quarters for a new 
consensus on which to base collective action.‖ It concludes by saying that ―the 
protection and promotion of the universal values of the rule of law, human rights and 
democracy are ends in themselves. They are also essential for a world of justice, 
opportunity and stability. No security agenda and no drive for development will be 
successful unless they are based on the sure foundation of respect for human 
dignity‖.28   
 
It might be perceived today as a paradox that democracy does not constitute a 
prerequisite for State membership in the United Nations not even a priority criterion.  
More and more in regional arrangements, such as in the Organisation of American 
States, a democratic clause is being introduced as a condition to accession.
29
  
 
In the United Nations, the Charter in its Article 4
th
 affirms that the Organization is 
open to all peace loving states which accept the obligations in the Charter and that, 
according to the Organization, are apt and willing to fulfil these obligations. No state 
has ever declared to be bellicose although historically some waged wars allegedly 
declaring to be in pursuit of a lasting peace. 
                                                 
27 UN, General Assembly, Doc. A/59/2005, 21st March 2005, paragraph 13 
 
28 UN, General Assembly, Doc. A/59/2005, 21st March 2005, paragraph 128 
 
29 The United Nations membership are dealt with in Articles 3 to 6 of the UN Charter. 
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While there is no one model of democracy suitable for all societies, resistance to the 
democratization process in some cases seems, according to the UN Secretary General, 
to cloak authoritarianism in claims of cultural difference. 
 
Democracy is on the global agenda and regional particularities have to be taken into 
account when universal principles and norms are to be established. It is a grass-root 
process that can find inspiration but cannot be imposed from outside. Secular source 
of sovereignty and legitimacy, pluralistic multi-party political structures, independent 
judiciary, free market economies with adequate mechanisms to assure supervision and 
transparency represent the model of democracy widely accepted.  
 
Kofi Annan‘s reflections on democracy followed a work by his predecessor Boutros 
Boutros-Gali, published in 1996 under the title ―An Agenda for Democratization‖.30 
There he explains the evolution of the meaning of democracy in world affairs. Thus, in 1945, 
democracy was a clear concept as defined by the Allied nations in opposition to fascism. But 
with the onset of the cold war, democracy came to be propounded from two perspectives, East 
and West. As the third world took its place on the international stage, its members strove to 
find their own methods of government, appropriate to their needs, providing in the process 
alternative perspectives on democracy. According to Boutros-Gali, the rapidly changing 
global scene had set the age-old concept of democracy in a new light: ―while differences in 
the economic, social, cultural and historical circumstances of the world's societies mean that 
differences will continue between democracy as viewed by one society and democracy as 
viewed by another, democracy is increasingly being recognized as a response to a wide range 
of human concerns and as essential to the protection of human rights‖.31  
 
In the last decades, commitment to democracy is becoming a condition clause for 
participation in regional organizations. According to the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter: ―The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their 
governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.‖ 32 By asserting this basic 
                                                 
30 Boutros-Gali, Boutros, An Agenda for Democratization, New York, 1996 
 
31 Ibid pg 6 
 
32 Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States 
at its special session held in Lima, Peru, on September 11, 2001. 
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universal right, the document upholds the principle that an interruption of the 
democratic order, or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that 
seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state, constitutes an 
insurmountable obstacle to that government's participation in the inter-American 
system.
33
 
 
The Charter further states that in its Article 2: ―The effective exercise of 
representative democracy is the basis for the rule of law and of the constitutional 
regimes of the member states of the Organization of American States. Representative 
democracy is strengthened and deepened by permanent, ethical, and responsible 
participation of the citizenry within a legal framework conforming to the respective 
constitutional order.‖ 
 
According to the Inter-American Democracy Charter, ―essential elements of 
representative democracy include, inter alia, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the 
rule of law, the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting 
and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic 
system of political parties and organizations, and the separation of powers and 
independence of the branches of government.‖ 34 
 
Within the African Union, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance (ACDEG) was adopted in Addis Ababa on January 30, 2007. The 
document must be ratified by 15 states before it actually enters into effect.  
 
It was developed as part of the African Union‘s stated emphasis on promoting 
democracy and good governance in member states. The ratification of the Charter and 
the outcome of the current crisis over Zimbabwe‘s elections will test the regional 
paradigm of democracy in Africa as well and the role of the international community 
in supporting it.
35
 
                                                 
33 Ibid Article 19. 
 
34 Ibid Article 3 
35 The African Charter on Democracy was adopted by the Eighth Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly, 
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 30 January 2007, but has been ratified so far by a few countries. 
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Democratic accountability requires more than an electoral mandate. For elections to 
be genuinely free, and for people to feel genuinely represented in government, much 
more is needed: institutional checks and balances, an independent judiciary, viable 
political parties, a free press and the freedom of each individual to express his or her 
ideas without fear of retribution.  
 
One of the main challenges of this century will be to achieve not only national 
democratic governance worldwide but also to strengthen international relations with 
the values and principles of political representation and human rights. Those are the 
same values, principles and rights that once inspired Revolutions in Europe and in 
America, the struggle against colonialism in Latin America, Asia and Africa, as well 
as the emergence of national liberation movements and the action of organised civil 
societies to defend the rights of minorities, cultural identities and social objectives.    
 
Behind the formation of the United States of America in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries 
and of the European Union in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries, some common principles and 
ideas as well as institutions could be identified. In both cases there was an urge for 
freedom and constitutional democracy, representation, participation and 
accountability. In both cases, there was a strong belief in the need of a system of 
checks and balances to prevent arbitrary behaviour and abuses of power. In both cases 
a commitment to uphold the rule of law prevailed together with the notion that no one 
should be above the law.  
 
In the Millennium Declaration all nations reaffirmed their pledge to the rule of law as 
the all-important framework for advancing human security and prosperity.
36
 The 
strengthening of constitutional democracy and the rule of law should take place 
primarily within nation-states but the principles and concepts of participation, 
representation and accountability involved should be more and more part of 
international relations and a global order.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
36 According to the Millennium Declaration, “Good governance comprises the rule of law, effective state 
institutions, transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs, respect for human rights, and 
the participation of all citizens in the decisions that affect their lives”. Op cit pg 22 
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There should be no paradoxical attitudes in relation to individual States and the 
international community as a whole, those principles should apply to both in order to 
be more effective and inspire a better understanding of their value and purpose.  
 
 
For Boutros-Gali, ―democratization is the most reliable way to legitimize and improve 
national governance, it is also the most reliable way to legitimize and improve 
international organization, making it more open and responsive by increasing 
participation, more efficient by allowing for burden-sharing and more effective by 
allowing for comparative advantage and greater creativity. Moreover, just like 
democratization within States, democratization at the international level is based on 
and aims to promote the dignity and worth of the individual human being and the 
fundamental equality of all persons and of all peoples‖.37    
 
He proceeds stating that: ―The new world environment has strengthened this 
fundamental link between democratization nationally and internationally. Once, 
decision-making in global affairs could have only a limited effect on the internal 
affairs of States and the daily lives of their peoples. Today, decisions concerning 
global matters carry with them far reaching domestic consequences, blurring the lines 
between international and domestic policy. In this way, unrepresentative decisions on 
global issues can run counter to democratization within a State and undermine a 
people's commitment to it. Thus, democratization within States may fail to take root 
unless democratization extends to the international arena.‖38   
 
 
                                                 
37 Ibid pgs 26 and 27 paragraph 66 
 
38 Ibid pg 27 paragraph 67 
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            Chapter IV 
The Use of Force 
 
 
The settlement of disputes through the force of arms has been part of the history of 
humankind. The monopoly of coercion came as a result of the creation of modern 
states, when war was still considered a legitimate means to advance national interests. 
During the ―Enlightenment‖, in the 18th century,39 limits to the traditional behaviour 
of settling differences by force were imposed. The question of the legality of war 
started then to be examined. Accountability to citizens for the use of military forces 
has become a central component of the struggle to establish democratic forms of 
government. In 1945, after the scourge of two major wars in the core of western 
civilization, that effort was reflected in the Charter of the United Nations, whose main 
purpose was to render the use of force between states unlawful.  
 
The threat or use of force was first globally proscribed in Article 2.4 of the United 
Nations Charter. Under that provision, all Members of the Organization shall refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations.  
 
Therefore the UN Charter prohibits armed force in international relations. Force may 
be used in self-defence if there is an actual or imminent threat of an armed attack. Yet, 
the use of force must be necessary, that is the only means of averting an attack; and 
the force used must be proportionate response. It is now widely accepted that an 
imminent armed attack would justify the use of force if the other conditions are met. 
The concept of what is imminent may depend on the circumstances.  
 
                                                 
39 The philosophical development of that period inspired moral, social, and political change. It promoted the 
concept of self-governance, natural rights, liberty from oppression, reason, individual rights, common sense, 
among others. These principles constituted a revolutionary departure from theocracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and 
the divine right of kings which prevailed during the Middle Ages. The world evolved then from being teocentric 
into antroprocentric. Religious authority, guild-based economic systems, and censorship of ideas were replaced by 
a rational discourse and personal judgment, republicanism, liberalism, scientific method and a sense of social 
responsibility and the rule of law. Such revolutionary changes had also a bearing on the resort to coertion. 
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With the exception of the right of self-defense, decisions about the use of military 
force were to be made in the context of international institutions, as established by 
Article 39 of the Charter: ―The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 
41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security‖. 
 
For democratic countries which are not permanent members of the Security Council, 
those decisions would take place far from the representative structures that their 
governments have relied upon to provide accountability.  
 
In fact, the deficit of representation and accountability within the system of 
international collective security seems to have been enhanced and become even more 
conspicuous as a consequence of two historic events at the onset of the 21
st
 century: 
September 11 and the Invasion of Iraq. Because of these two events, the international 
agenda put forward in the Millennium Declaration and based on the strengthening of 
multilateralism was replaced by a different one whose success would allegedly 
depend on swift response by military means, even if unilaterally decided upon.  
 
The September 11 terrorist attack against the United States in 2001 represented a 
challenge to the security paradigm both domestic and abroad. It contributed to further 
boost a tendency by Permanent Members of the Security Council in favour of 
broadening the concept of security in order to include non-military threats to states as 
well as non-military and military threats to groups and individuals.  
 
In its turn, the US led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 raised grave questions 
concerning the legality of that military action, the paralysis of the Security Council, 
the need of checks and balances and review mechanisms on the decision making 
process to authorize the use of force and the lack of the necessary public scrutiny and 
transparency. 
 
These issues were not new and have been debated for a long time. What might be 
different in this new millennium is the prevailing widespread urge on the part of the 
international community to promote the rule of law, to ensure accountability in 
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international relations without exclusion of the most serious cases involving matters 
under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter. 
 
As the Security Council seeks to widen its responsibility by enlarging the concept of 
what constitutes a threat to or a breach of international peace and security, the answer 
to questions raised by the invasion of Iraq and enhanced by the present credibility 
crisis affecting national and international institutions in the core of the western system 
has become ever more demanding morally and politically.  
 
On a highly controversial legal basis, the invasion may represent the "last straw" in 
decades of stretching the UN Charter to cover actions by the major powers in a 
manner not expressly contemplated in Chapter 7. Whether or not it was done under 
UN authority, that invasion demonstrates the need to strengthen the legal regime on 
the use of force and to make the UN Security Council more effective and its members 
more accountable in matters concerning alleged threats to peace and international 
security. 
 
Despite the initial emphasis on a so-called ―doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence‖40, 
the US Government has ended up justifying the legality of its action against Iraq not 
on that evolved ―right‖ to strike, but rather on a twelve-year old Security Council 
Resolution 678 (91), which authorized in 1991 a coalition of states to repel Iraq from 
Kuwait and to restore peace and security in the area.  
 
 
The US argued that Iraq violated its obligations under the UN-mandated cease-fire, 
which thus amounted to a "material breach" of the cease-fire conditions that had the 
effect of "reviving" the earlier authorization to use force. The same legal theory was 
asserted by other members of the U.S.-led coalition.  
 
                                                 
40 Nine months after September 11, 2001, in a speech at West Point, President George W Bush declared that the 
US could not always rely for its security on traditional strategies of deterrence and containment. Instead, he 
claimed that faced with the perils posed by terrorist networks and rogue states acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction, it might have to strike first before the danger had materialised. That justification for the use of force, 
and its profound implications for the UN Charter prescriptions, raised serious legal, moral and philosophical 
issues. It was not clear if the Bush Administration was seeking to create a new legal basis for the use of force that 
would be available to all states. Or whether it was trying to create an exception to the existing legal rules that 
would only apply only to the US. 
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In a secret memo of 7 March 2003, the Attorney General of the United Kingdom, 
Peter Goldsmith, explained the possible legal basis for the use of force against Iraq. 
41
 
 
Although stating ―the UK‘s view that a violation of Iraq‘s obligations under resolution 
687, which is sufficiently serious to undermine the basis of the cease-fire, can revive 
the authorisation to use force in resolution 678‖, he observes the UK and the UN 
Legal Counsel opinion that, as the cease-fire conditions were set by the Security 
Council in resolution 687, it was for the Council to assess whether any such breach of 
obligations have occurred.  
 
However, according to the UK Attorney General, ―the argument that resolution 1441 
alone has revived the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 will only be 
sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to 
take the final opportunity. In other words, we would need to be able to demonstrate 
hard evidence of non-compliance and non-cooperation‖  
 
He finally stressed that: ―the lawfulness of military action depends not only on the 
existence of a legal basis, but also on the question of proportionality. Any force used 
pursuant to the authorisation in resolution 678: 
 
- must have as its objective the enforcement of the terms of the cease-fire 
contained in resolution 687 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions; 
- be limited to what is necessary to achieve that objective; and 
- must be a proportionate response to that objective, i.e. securing compliance 
with Iraq‘s disarmament obligations‖. 
  
The legal theory deployed by the United States is not considered to be persuasive. The 
text of Resolution 678, and those resolutions that followed, along with the associated 
negotiating history and subsequent practice, individually and collectively demonstrate 
that the United States did not have Security Council authorization in March 2003 to 
invade Iraq. Moreover, regardless of whether one believes the U.S. legal theory as 
                                                 
41 The memo entitled “Advice on the Legality of Military Action Against Iraq”, became public and was reproduced 
in the Articles in Public International Law of the University of Oslo, Faculty of Law, 2006, pgs 61 to 73. 
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persuasive, the complexity of the theory (with its reliance on Security Council 
decisions taken years earlier to address different circumstances) and the clear 
resistance of a majority of Security Council members in March 2003 to the 
deployment of force against Iraq combined to strip the invasion of Iraq of the 
collective legitimacy. 
 
Indeed, the invasion of Iraq raises serious questions about the international regime on 
the use of force and the role of the Security Council. If the United States proceeded 
without authority under international law, then what is the consequence for the rule of 
law and the institutions which represent it? If the United States advanced despite 
opposition within the UN Security Council, then what conclusions should be drawn in 
relation to the Security Council, to its jurisdiction under the Charter and, more 
broadly, to  international law?   
 
Before the war broke out, forty-three Australian experts in international law and 
human rights legislation, amongst them Sir Ronald Wilson, a former High Court 
judge and the President of the Human Rights Commission in Canberra, have issued a 
declaration that an invasion of Iraq would be an open breach of international law and 
a crime against humanity. The declaration was published by the Sydney Morning 
Herald on the 26
th
 February 2003. Australia was a member of the ―coalition of the 
willing‖ which under the US leadership invaded Iraq in March 2003. 
  
The Australian legal experts rejected the justifications for war being made by the 
American, British and Australian governments as a violation of the UN Charter, under 
which there are only two grounds for the use of force in international conflicts. As 
they explained: ―The first, enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 
allows force to be used in self-defence. The attack must be actual or imminent. The 
second basis is when the UN Security Council authorises the use of force as a 
collective response to the use or threat of force. However, the Security Council is 
bound by the terms of the UN Charter and can authorise the use of force only if there 
is evidence that there is an actual threat to the peace (in this case, by Iraq) and that 
this threat cannot be averted by any means short of force (such as negotiation and 
further weapons inspections).‖ 
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Having outlined the legal basis for war, the declaration concluded: ―Members of the 
‗coalition of the willing‘… have not yet presented any persuasive arguments that an 
invasion of Iraq can be justified by international law.‖  
 
It further argues that ―the weak and ambiguous evidence presented to the international 
community by the US Secretary of State Colin Powell to justify a pre-emptive strike 
underlines the danger of a doctrine of pre-emption. A principle of pre-emption would 
allow particular national agendas to completely destroy the system of collective 
security contained in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and return us to the pre-1945 era, 
where might equalled right.‖ 
 
The letter goes on by stating that there is another ―legal dimension‖ which would 
form the basis for a war crimes indictment of those responsible for any invasion of 
Iraq—the likely extent of Iraqi civilian casualties: ―Even if the use of force can be 
justified, international humanitarian law places significant limits on the means and 
methods of warfare‖. 
 
Recent State practice on enforcement of repression of terrorism, disarmament 
obligations and humanitarian intervention pose a serious challenge to the current legal 
regulation of the use of force. The concept of security has been further politicised. 
42
 
 
Would it be possible that poor political decisions based on lack of scrutiny and 
intelligence are creating precedents that could eventually be used to impose a 
precarious and self-serving dynamics in international law?  
 
Would it be fair to assume that the content of the rules governing the use of force in 
international law could evolve and be construed on the basis of flaws and fallacies 
                                                 
42 Fierke, K.M., Critical Approaches to International Security, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2007, pg 1. 
According to Fierke, “in the decade before the end of the Cold War the concept of security was politicised. Its 
previous narrow definition, relating to the threat or use of force by states, gave way to a broadening of the term to 
cover new referent objects and threats”. He sustains that the politics of security went beyond its military 
dimension and that there is a “renewed conflation of security with the use of force”. He further identifies an 
“expansionist agenda”, which, with the end of the Cold War, sought to replace the emphasis on the state and the 
threat or use of force with a broader array of referent objects and sources of insecurity” (pg 2). But the most 
interesting part of its work may be when he raises the question of “what is security” and how it should be 
examined. He analyses the meaning and use of the concept of security and its relevance to empirical problems, 
“ranging from the end of the Cold War, NATO expansion, religious and ethnic conflict, migration, suffering in 
war, the construction of liberal democracy, the War on Terrorism and Hurricane Katrina”.  
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rather than on postulates grounded on sound judgement open to the scrutiny of the 
community of nations and reiterated in subsequent documents?  
 
These are questions that still must be thoroughly examined as the prohibition of the 
use of force established in the United Nations Charter represents one of the most 
important changes in international public law after two successive world wars.  
 
Despite the ban on the right of States to use military force unilaterally and the efforts 
to establish ways in which military force could be used for collective purposes under 
the auspices of international institutions, hundreds of conflicts have broken out since 
1945. In cases, which involved unilateral use of force by Permanent Members of the 
Security Council, accountability was an issue.  
 
The record of selectivity in choosing which cases Chapter Seven should be applied to 
as well as the prerogatives proper of the Five Permanent Member of the Security 
Council make even more relevant the question of how to ensure democratic 
accountability in the use of means of coercion.  
 
In 1974, the UN General Assembly, in order to contribute to the strengthening of 
international peace and security, adopted, through Resolution 3314 (XXIX), the 
following definition of Aggression, considering it “the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations...‖. The 
Resolution also called the Security Council to take it into account as guidance in 
determining, in accordance with the Charter, the existence of an act of aggression. 
 
The definition of aggression contemplates only States actors. Furthermore, there is no 
legal or other definition that describes the type of situation that is regarded as ―a threat 
to the peace‖. The UN Security Council decides, on a case-by-case basis, whether a 
situation threatens the peace.  
 
The experience over 64 years has revealed a wide gap between what was intended by 
the drafters of Chapter 7 and the implementation of its prescriptions. As previously 
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indicated 
43
, many acts of aggression and breaches of peace have occurred since 1945 
without any recourse to the enforcement measures of Chapter 7.  
 
In December 2004, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, 
submitted to the General Assembly a Report ―A More Secure World: Our shared 
responsibility‖ introducing the conclusions of the High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change.
44
  
 
The Panel set out a broad framework for collective security and adopted a broad 
perspective on security. Annan ―wholly endorsed its core arguments for a broader, 
more comprehensive concept of collective security‖. In presenting it to the UN 
General Assembly, he singled out the Panel‘s insistence that we must see the 
interconnectedness of contemporary threats to our security. In his view, we cannot 
treat issues such as terrorism or civil wars or extreme poverty in isolation: ―the 
implications of this interconnectedness are profound. Our strategies must be 
comprehensive‖. 
 
The High Level Panel acknowledged that security threats might go far beyond States 
waging aggressive war. They could extend to poverty, infectious disease and 
environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread and possible 
use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and 
transnational organized crime. The threats could come from non-State actors as well 
as States, and to human security as well as State security. 
 
The panel defended this expansionist concept of security. It argued that the 
preoccupation of the United Nations founders was with State security. So, when they 
spoke of creating a new system of collective security they meant it in the traditional 
military sense: a system in which States join together and pledge that aggression 
against one is aggression against all, and commit themselves in that event to react 
collectively. But they also understood well, according to the Panel, long before the 
idea of human security gained currency, the indivisibility of security, economic 
development and human freedom. Thus, in the opening words of the Charter, the 
                                                 
43 Vide pg 20, third paragraph. 
44 The Report of the Secretary-General was tabled as UN document A/59/565. 
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United Nations was created ―to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights‖ and ―to 
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom‖.45   
 
Indeed, according to the Secretary General, the central challenge for the twenty-first 
century is to foster a new and broader understanding, bringing together all these 
strands, of what collective security means — and of all the responsibilities, 
commitments, strategies and institutions that come with it if a collective security 
system is to be effective, efficient and equitable.  
 
In its Report, the High Level Panel stressed that any strategy to combat the new 
international challenges must be respectful of the rule of law and the universal 
observance of human rights. It stated that the question on when and how force can be 
used to defend international peace and security has also deeply divided Member 
States. They had disagreed about whether States have the right to use military force 
pre-emptively, to defend themselves against imminent threats; whether they have the 
right to use it preventively to defend themselves against latent or non-imminent 
threats; and whether they have the right — or perhaps the obligation — to use it 
protectively to rescue the citizens of other States from genocide or comparable 
crimes.  
 
According to the Panel, when considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of 
military force, the Council should come to a common view on how to weigh the 
seriousness of the threat; the proper purpose of the proposed military action; whether 
means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat; 
whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand; and whether there is a 
reasonable chance of success. By undertaking to make the case for military action in 
this way, the Council would add transparency to its deliberations and make its 
decisions more likely to be respected, by both Governments and world public opinion.  
 
The Panel recommended the Security Council to adopt a resolution setting out these 
principles and expressing its intention to be guided by them when deciding whether to 
authorize or mandate the use of force. 
                                                 
45 United Nations Charter, Preamble,  paragraph 2 
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Both the record of the Council as well as of its permanent members under the 
protection of the veto are not encouraging. Either inaction by the Council or arbitrary 
and non transparent decisions by the major powers represent a threat to the authority 
of the collective security system, to the legitimacy of the composition of the Council 
and its voting procedure, and ultimately to its capacity to represent the international 
community.  
 
No structural changes have been so far approved by the Security Council and no 
resolution on the use of force has yet been adopted as requested by the Secretary 
General.  
 
The question remains as to how recent unilateral trends and ethnocentrism have 
influenced the role and function of the Council as well as the integrity of the Charter 
system. Do cases such as the armed conflict between Israeli military apparatus and 
Hamas fighters in the Gaza Strip in 2009 constitute an example of use of force in 
accordance with the current legal doctrine? Or should they deserve to be further 
scrutinized to verify whether they reflect prevailing moral values and pattern of veto 
cast within the Security Council? 
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       Chapter V 
The Expanding Powers of the Security Council 
 
 
The Security Council has been expanding its powers by arrogating to itself in the 
discharge of its duties a legislative and a judicial competence. This expansion is being 
achieved through practice rather than reform. After the terrorist attacks against the 
United States of America on September 11, 2001 and the ―war on terror‖46 declared 
by the US Administration, such an expansion of power became conspicuous and its 
consequences started to be felt by Nation States, as well as individuals worldwide. 
 
On 12 September 2001 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, which in its 
preamble recognizes the right of individual and collective self-defence of the United 
States and other States willing to assist it. However, in operative paragraph 1 it 
considered the terrorist acts of September 11 as ‗a threat to the peace‘ and not an 
‗armed attack‘ which would legitimise self-defence under Article 51. The same 
pattern was repeated in Resolution 1373 passed by the Council on September 28 and 
based upon Chapter Seven.  
 
On that date, the North Atlantic Council took a decision based on Article 5 of NATO 
Statute, which established the right of collective self-defence in case of attack on one 
of the members of the Alliance. Its members chose therefore the solution based on 
Article 51 rather than the collective use of force under the authority of the Security 
Council. 
 
Thus, in a matter of days, decisions were taken in a way to overcome opposition 
within the Security Council to the use of force. The question remains if there was then 
a clear scrutiny of who was responsible under international law for the perpetration of 
the attacks against the Unites States on September 11, 2001. The recourse to that 
combination of political and legal decisions from different international organizations 
                                                 
46 On September 20, 2001, addressing a joint session of congress, President George W. Bush launched what he 
called the war on terror: "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." 
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was interpreted by analysts as ―a considerable departure from the legal system on the 
use of force, to the effect of broadening the notion of self-defence‖ 47 
 
On 7 October 2001, the United States, assisted by the United Kingdom, started 
military action against Afghanistan in order to eliminate the bases of terrorist 
organisations and promote the change of the Taliban regime believed to be associated 
with them. In a letter to the UN Security Council, the US government asserted its 
right to use force not only against Afghanistan but also against other organizations 
and countries involved in terrorism. It has been maintained that the position of the UN 
Security Council coupled with the substantial lack of contestation and indeed massive 
support by States of the US action, could be seen as amounting to ―instant customary 
law and an authoritative re-interpretation of the Charter‖.  Cassese challenges the 
existence of ―consistent practice and opinion juris required for customary change‖, 
moreover in an issue of such overarching importance.
48
   
 
Among the questions raised in relation to the United States led military action against 
Afghanistan the following should be singled out: 1) lack of a Security Council 
resolution considering the attacks against the US an armed aggression as defined by 
Article 1 of Resolution 3314 (1974), ―aggression is the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations‖; 2) the 
absence of a legal recognition of State responsibility in relation to Afghan authorities, 
taking into account Art 9 of ILC Draft Articles on States Responsibility: ―The conduct 
of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the 
governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in 
circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority‖ 49 ; 3) 
                                                 
47 Cassese, Antonio, International Law, Oxford University Press, second edition, pg 474). 
 
48 Ibid, pg 47 
49 On 21 January 2009, speaking at a Conference organized to commemorate in Oslo the 50 Anniversary of NUPI, 
Lakhdar Brahimi, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Afghanistan regretted that 
members of the Taliban regime were not invited to the Bonn Conference in 2001 when in his view that regime still 
then could not be fully identified with Al Qaeda, an organization which has claimed  responsibility for the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. 
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Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), despite recognizing the 
right of self- defence, could not legitimise military action against Afghanistan, taking 
into account Article 51 of the UN Charter, which refers specifically to ―armed attack‖ 
as a ―condition sine qua non‖ for such a lawful reaction50 ; 4) self-defence should 
observe certain conditions well established in international law, such as the temporary 
character of the resort to self-defence and the proportionality of the action in relation 
to the aggression. Regime change and prolonged occupation of a country could not be 
considered the legitimate objective of self-defence; 5) the military action against 
Afghanistan would represent, for some, a sort of armed retribution of a repressive 
character in violation of art 2 paragraph 4 and art 2, paragraphs 1 and 7 of the UN 
Charter; others, however, considered it a justifiable war.
51
 
  
The legislative phase of the Security Council was significantly enhanced by the 
adoption of Resolution 1373 (2001), as it imposed a regime to fight terrorism, which 
transcends the September 11 attacks. The Resolution contains obligations to prevent 
the financing of terrorism, to freeze funds, to exchange information, to punish 
terrorists, and to establish effective border controls. Because of the scope of such 
broad obligations, it is considered a truly legislative resolution under Chapter 7 of the 
Charter, mandatory to all States, most of them did not participate in the discussion of 
the matter and will have to apply it as it were a Treaty.  
 
In fact, the enforcement powers of the Security Council are replacing the conventional 
law making process on the international level. As a consequence of Resolution 1373 
(2001) many obligations of the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism of 1999 became universal, although the Convention would only enter into 
force in March 2002. 
 
                                                 
50 According to Article 51 of the UN Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security…”;  
 
51 Falk, Richard, Appraising the War against Afghanistan, Princeton University, 2002. In early retrospect, he 
considers “possible to appraise recourse to (the Afghanistan)  war by relying on a flexible interpretation of the 
just war doctrine combined with the rule of reason that takes account of the new context established by a defensive 
war raged against a global terrorist network of demonstrated will and capacity to inflict catastrophic harm on 
civilian society”. Yet, he stresses the “importance of identifying and adhering to limits is of great significance 
here”.     
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Resolutions 1422 (2002) and 1487 (2003) on the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
constitute other examples of legislative action taken by the Security Council. They 
enabled the Council to address a general request to the ICC to defer, for a twelve 
month period, investigation or prosecution of any case involving current or former 
official or personnel from a contributing state not a party to the Rome Statute of the 
ICC, over acts or omission relating to the United Nations –established or  - authorized 
operation. The resolutions were criticized by member states for not specifying a threat 
to the peace as a precondition for Chapter 7 action. States also disagreed on whether 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute allowed for such a general request. 
52
 
 
Adopted unanimously by the Security Council, Resolution 1540 (2004) would further 
confirm allegations of legislative activities as it, under Chapter 7, mandates all States 
to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors that attempt to acquire, use 
or transfer nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. All 
States must therefore establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of such 
weapons and means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, including by 
establishing appropriate controls over related materials, and adopt legislative 
measures in that respect. 
 
Also by that text, the Council decided to establish, for a period of no longer than two 
years, a committee comprising all Council members, which would report on the 
implementation of the present resolution.  It called on States to present a first report to 
that committee, no later than six months from the adoption of the resolution, on steps 
they had taken or intended to take in its implementation. 
 
By other terms of the text, the Council decided that none of the obligations set forth in 
the resolution would be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and 
obligations of State parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the 
responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). 
                                                 
52 Stefan Talmon, Articles in Public International Law, UIO, 2006, pg 6. 
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Further by the text, the Council called on all States to:  promote the universal 
adoption, as well as full implementation and strengthening, of multilateral treaties 
aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons; 
adopt national rules and regulations to ensure compliance with their commitments 
under the key multilateral non-proliferation treaties; renew and fulfil their 
commitment to multilateral cooperation, particularly within the framework of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important 
means of achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and 
promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes; and develop appropriate 
ways to work with industry and the public regarding their obligations under such 
laws. 
 
No country would dispute the importance of the matter addressed by Resolution 1540 
(2004), the question that remains concerns the legality of the Council, under present 
circumstances of representation and powers, to legislate for the world and replace 
treaty-making process. Over-simplifications and errors of judgement and analysis as 
well as intelligence flaws would have clearly recommended a more prudent and 
legitimate course of action. In domestic legal system this would correspond to a due 
process of law.  
 
The question of the expansion of legislative powers by the Security Council tends to 
become ever more politically delicate due to the absence of transparency and 
accountability, of checks and balances, of a review mechanism and is aggravated by 
the lack of a reform to make the Council a more representative and democratic body.  
 
In addition to that, as the concept of what constitutes a threat to peace and security has 
not been legally defined, the power of the Council to determine, on a case-by-case 
scenario, what is and what is not a threat or a breach could be eventually questioned 
depending on the merit of such decisions and on other attributes that would ensure 
and enhance their legitimacy.  
  
 45 
 As the concept of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security is 
broadening, transparency and accountability in the decision making process should 
become most probably a condition sine qua non to protect the interests of nation states 
which are not Permanent Members of the Security Council and do not enjoy the right 
of veto over the Council‘s decisions.  
 
In the introduction of the 2004 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change
53
, the Secretary General of the United Nations stressed the need to reach 
a new security consensus as the challenges in the 21
st
 century, according to the Panel, 
―go far beyond States waging aggressive war‖… ―and extend to poverty, infectious 
disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread 
and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; 
and transnational organized crime‖. It acknowledged also that these threats are from 
non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as State security.  
 
Annan endorsed the core conclusion of the High Panel that: ―the central challenge for 
the twenty-first century is to fashion a new and broader understanding, bringing 
together all these strands, of what collective security means - and of all the 
responsibilities, commitments, strategies and institutions that come with it if a 
collective security system is to be effective, efficient and equitable. 
 
The Panel also stressed that if there is to be a new security consensus, it must start 
with the understanding that the front-line actors in dealing with all the threats we face, 
new and old, continue to be individual sovereign States, whose role and 
responsibilities, and right to be respected, are fully recognized in the Charter of the 
United Nations.  
 
For the High Level Panel, more than ever before, no State can stand wholly alone in 
the twenty-first century. Collective strategies, collective institutions and a sense of 
collective responsibility are indispensable. The case for collective security would rest 
on three basic pillars. Today‘s threats recognize no national boundaries. They are 
connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as national levels. 
                                                 
53 Annan, Kofi, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility”(UN doc: A/59/565), 200,pg 14 
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According to the Panel: ―no State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts 
alone make itself invulnerable to today‘s threats. And it cannot be assumed that every 
State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to protect its own 
peoples and not to harm its neighbours. We must not underestimate the difficulty of 
reaching a new consensus about the meaning and responsibilities of collective 
security‖54  
 
The first years after the end of the cold war seemed to point towards a new role for the 
United Nations. In 1990, the Security Council authorized the use of force against Iraq 
to liberate Kuwait. The Security Council broadened the interpretation of threats to 
international peace and security to authorize an intervention for humanitarian 
purposes in Somalia….‖ 55  
The concept paper prepared by the United Kingdom for the Security Council open 
debate of 17 April 2007 is an example of initiatives on the part of some permanent 
members of the Council in relation to the expansion of its role. The paper deals with 
the relationship between energy, security and climate and the risks of international 
conflict. It addresses the impact on potential drivers of conflict (such as access to 
energy, water, food and other scarce resources, population movements and border 
disputes). 56 
Taking into account the actions of the Security Council as well as this diplomatic 
process of reaching a consensus on a broadening notion of what constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security, the expansion of the Security Council powers 
through practice on decisions of legislative or judicial nature deserve closer analysis. 
It will become ever more important for the affected parties and the international 
community in general to make sure that those deliberations are within the competence 
                                                 
54 Ibid pg 9  
55 Ibid pg13. 
 
56 The concept paper on “Energy, Security and Climate”, presented by the UK for the Security Council open 
debate on 17 April 2007 can be found at: http://unfccc.int/files/application/pdf/ukpaper_securitycouncil.pdf 
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of that body according to the Charter and that their rights are safeguarded against 
abuses of powers.  
 
As there is no international review mechanism for the decisions taken by the Council 
under Chapter Seven, which are mandatory to all member states of the United 
Nations, a greater awareness should develop of the deficit of representation and 
legitimacy within the system of collective security.  
  
In the context of the administration of international justice the question is whether 
and, if so, where and on what conditions, a line should be drawn between, on the one 
hand, decisions of the Security Council specifically and directly related to its task of 
maintaining and restoring international peace and security and, on the other, legal 
prescriptions that must be automatically enforced by the whole international 
community. Is it right that the Council acts as a court of law in the sense of 
determining what conduct is lawful or unlawful for the whole international 
community. Can the Security Council impose on States rules from treaties that they 
have not adhered to?  
 
On the other hand, has a permanent member of the Security Council a license to act 
unilaterally and abuse its privileged powers so as to impose to the whole international 
community, independently of its will, the most serious consequences of that 
member‘s actions in matters related to waging war under the pretence of maintenance 
of international peace and security? 
 
If we accept that the Security Council has these legislative and judicial powers what 
would be the implications for the exercise of consent in international law or is it 
covered by the acceptance of Article 24 of the Charter? How would one explain the 
importance of consent in international judicial proceedings and the need to identify in 
relation to the International Court of Justice in each case a specific act of consent for 
establishing jurisdiction? Is it not a contradiction that States appear willing to 
recognize the kind of summary and relatively unregulated activity of the Security 
Council while at the same time resisting the exercise by international tribunals of an 
orderly and reasoned jurisdiction in respect of disputes which not often rise to the 
same level of political importance? 
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This first decade of the new millennium has already given mankind the measure of the 
changes and challenges nation states, individuals and the world will experience in a 
much more interconnected, complex and fragmented international community where 
the strengthening of the rule of law has become as imperative as it was for nation 
states themselves.  
  
If the Security Council, through its enforcement powers, is replacing convention law-
making process in matters concerning maintenance of peace and security, are 
Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) examples of this expanding jurisdiction of 
the Council? Has the Security Council entered a legislative phase and is enacting laws 
binding on all the Members of the United Nations, despite of their consent? Where 
will these self arrogated prerogatives lead with an unchecked progressive expansion 
of the notion of what constitutes a threat to peace and security, in particular to those 
countries which are not permanent members of the Security Council and are directly 
affected by the lack of representation and democratic deficit of that body? Are the 
normative powers of the Security Council, the interaction between the Charter and 
customary international law, and the processes of desuetude and informal 
modification of treaties being stretched to the limit of prudence and legitimacy? What 
constraints operate on the Council when it begins to assume legislative and judicial 
functions? 
 
These questions must be more thoroughly examined than they have been so far taking 
into account the main principles of representation and democracy that constitutes an 
element of legitimacy in the exercise of power in international relations.  
 
It is widely recognized that the Security Council has been expanding its powers for 
almost twenty years, taking on judicial functions and interceding in the jurisdiction of 
international courts. It has established international tribunals with criminal jurisdiction 
over individuals, created exceptions to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court, ruled on border disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, and applied sanctions to 
both states and individuals. When the Security Council performs its functions under 
Chapter Seven of the Charter and determines the existence of a threat to international 
peace and security, it enjoys a wide margin of discretion in choosing the appropriate 
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course of action. The latitude of such a prerogative and the evolving character of the 
concept of threat to peace on which the Security Council basis its actions would 
demand enhanced legitimacy and representation by the Council as well growing 
scrutiny by the international community as a whole. 
 
These questions should be more openly addressed by the whole international 
community before the Security Council adopts a new paradigm of collective security. 
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                                      Conclusion 
  
During the Cold War, Great Powers‘ politics prevailed upon international law and 
affected the system of collective security established by the Charter of the United 
Nations. Post-1989 transformations represented an opportunity to make the Security 
Council work properly and enhance the rule of law. Yet the first eight years of the 21
st
 
century were a time of missed opportunities in a transition from a world of hegemonic 
power into an age of multipolarity. Instead of being strengthened, international law 
and the system of collective security have being weakened either by the 
misinterpretation of challenges, or the lack of transparency and accountability in the 
methods to investigate them, as well as the departure from old values, principles and 
rights that constitute the basis of the Security Council‘s legitimacy and moral 
authority.   
 
Collective enforcement under the UN Charter has become relatively free from the 
constraints of the East-West rivalry. Yet, the Security Council in matters pertaining to 
the maintenance of peace and security has continued to act in a selective manner not 
always on the merit of the cases and on the impartial scrutiny of the alleged reasons 
but rather on the political interest of the Permanent Members of the Council. 
Decisions on serious matters affecting the whole of the international community have 
been taken unilaterally by those members or within that Council, not so rarely on a 
controversial legal basis. Abuses of power raise the issues of consent for the exercise 
of jurisdiction, deficit of legitimacy and democratic representation within the Security 
Council, as well as the need for checks and balances and review mechanisms.   
 
Fairness and justice should prevail in order to ensure and enhance the credibility of 
the United Nations and its organ responsible for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. For sovereignty to continue losing its strength against the 
enforcement of mandatory resolutions of the Security Council, those decisions must 
be applied erga omnes, as it becomes harder for the international community to accept 
that a State or group of States should be above the law.  A culture is emerging to 
reject impunity and to ensure that every State, no matter how powerful, should not be 
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exempted from public international scrutiny and accountability. The continuous 
abuses by Permanent Members of the Security Council of their prerogatives make it 
ever more difficult to morally justify the reasons for the maintenance of such 
privileges in the 21
st
 century.   
 
It is a major responsibility for the international community to promote and restore 
greater respect for the rule of law domestically and internationally, as recognized in 
the Millennium Declaration. It will become ever more difficult for citizens of large 
democracies to acknowledge and accept that some States remain sovereign while 
most others are subject without proper representation to a process of continuous 
weakening of their consent.  
 
States must abide by the UN Charter, but this duty should not exclude criticism or 
condemnation whenever distortions threaten the legitimacy and the principles on 
which the United Nations are founded. It should neither prevent member states to 
pursue reforms that would enhance transparency and accountability and would ensure 
greater legitimacy in international decision making. The multilateral system will be 
weakened if the rights and responsibilities that emanate from a century old process of 
conquest and achievements of individual political freedoms are not properly 
recognized in the representation of nation states.  
 
A genuine and effective international law system can emerge to regulate a society 
formed by sovereign States if the price of prevailing instability becomes too high for 
the majority of its members when domination exclusively by power and self-interest 
do not attain the common objectives and when the loss of sovereignty affects only the 
weaker States among the international community.  The dangers of indiscriminate use 
of force and of a lawless world are so evident and challenging that international law 
must gradually emerge as a sine qua non condition for a sustainable international 
order. A common authoritative international legal system should be incrementally 
achieved as a means to avoid the prospect of an anarchical global society in which 
might makes right and significant part of the world population is deprived of proper 
representation in the decision making process that ultimately regulate their lives.  
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Under present circumstances of globalisation and interdependence, opportunities exist 
for establishing an international system which should be progressively based upon the 
principles of democracy and constitutionality. The rule of law is a necessary 
safeguard against arbitrary governance both in the local as well as in the global 
communities. Rights cannot be safeguarded on the former and be disregarded on the 
latter. The way to promote the rule of law in international relations is to reduce and 
eliminate what is left of its anarchical nature based on power and misrepresentation of 
justice and political rights.  
 
Despite the circumstances of power which affect the respect for international law, 
growing compliance with their norms and principles is being observed and enforced 
in different fields, including human rights, trade and environment. Before the 
adoption of the UN Charter, States were authorised to resort to military means to 
enforce their rights. There was then no general ban on the use of force. No 
adjudicating organ endowed with general and compulsory jurisdiction has ever been 
created. However, on the basis of Chapter 7, Security Council resolutions are 
mandatory and enforceable.  
 
Permanent Members of the Security Council have the faculty to escape compliance 
even with International Court of Justice‘s rulings. The relationship between the 
International Court of Justice and the Security Council well demonstrates the 
limitation for compliance by the Permanent Members. Given its primary function 
under the United Nations Charter for maintaining international peace and security, the 
Council prevails upon the Court.
57
  
 
Consequently, the Security Council can have control over the Court's ability to 
exercise its jurisdiction in cases being considered by the Council under its Chapter 7 
prerogatives. Such a restriction may affect the independence of the Court. If the Court 
is subject to the control of the Security Council - and to its political decision-making 
                                                 
57  According to Article 103 of the UN Charter, “in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members 
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”.  
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process – it cannot function independently and therefore preserve its legitimacy, 
authority and credibility.   
 
Article 94 of the UN Charter establishes that all members of the Organization must 
comply with decisions of the Court if they are parties and, therefore, recognize ICJ‘s 
jurisdiction. If the parties do not comply, the issue may be taken before the Security 
Council for enforcement action. Yet, if the judgment is against one of the permanent 
five members of the Security Council or its allies, any resolution on enforcement 
could be vetoed. The Nicaragua case
58
 constitutes an example of how the Permanent 
Members escape non-compliance with the Court's decision. When the Security 
Council refuses to enforce a judgment against a state, there is no alternative means of 
forcing the state to comply. 
 
The council‘s role in delimiting borders, establishing international criminal tribunals, 
governing territory, and passing laws of general application on terrorism and nuclear 
proliferation was not contemplated by the international community when the UN 
Charter was drafted and approved. This situation aggravates the problem of 
legitimacy in relation to the decisions of the Security Council under Chapter 7 and to 
the expansion of the notion of what constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security. 
 
The fact that the Council has acted does not make its actions legitimate and will not 
always guarantee that its actions are lawful. The Council's actions must be founded in 
the Charter. It can, for example, impose the respect of a cease-fire or another existing 
line under Chapter 7, in response to a specific threat to peace and security, but cannot 
                                                 
58 The Nicaragua case was a legal dispute between Nicaragua and the US submitted to the International Court of 
Justice, which, in 1986, ruled against the US and awarded reparations to Nicaragua. According to ICJ’s decision,  
the U.S. violated international law by supporting Contra guerrillas in their war against the Nicaraguan 
government and by mining Nicaragua's harbors. The court considered the US "in breach of its obligations under 
customary international law not to use force against another State", "not to intervene in its affairs", "not to violate 
its sovereignty", "not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce", and "in breach of its obligations under Article 
XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 
1956." The Court ruled in Nicaragua's favor after the States lost the argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the case, and refused to participate. It later blocked enforcement. 
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impose it as a legal boundary between two states where such a boundary is contested 
and had not been previously delimited.  
 
The absence of formal review mechanisms constitutes a problem to establishing a 
proper check on the Council's expansive interpretation of its powers. Formally some 
limits do exist, but they are rarely resorted to. The Council's own voting rules are a 
check on the uninhibited exercise of those powers. The General Assembly can 
challenge the Council's actions through a censure, question them through a request for 
an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, or curtail them through its 
control of the United Nations budget. The issue may be raised in an international 
tribunal as an incidental question in a case before it. And finally, ultimate 
accountability lies in the respect accorded to the Council's decisions: if the Council's 
powers were stretched beyond credibility, States retain the faculty of ignoring the 
expression of those powers and refuse to comply. However, when it comes to 
mandatory decisions of the Security Council, the rule is to comply. Otherwise, the 
Organization would lose prestige and could become irrelevant. 
 
In deciding whether there is a threat to international peace and security, the UN 
Security Council enjoys a wide margin of discretion in choosing the appropriate 
course of action. The need for a swift and effective response to a threat to 
international peace and security might require broad measures, without the safeguards 
which would apply to courts or to decisions taken by individual States. 
 
The absence of a clear definition of threat to peace and security increases the 
discretion of the Security Council members when deciding on Chapter Seven issues. 
As there is no review of the decisions of the Security Council, how would such 
discretion be considered in case the Council transcends its powers and misjudges the 
existence of a threat to peace or a breach of peace, which are concepts not legally 
defined?  
 
The concept of ―security‖ has evolved significantly. From a narrow political and 
military context, it is being pressed to expand further to acquire new dimensions, 
which would correspond to new threats and challenges, be they ―terrorism‖, the 
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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, major human rights violations, 
organised crime, failing states or environmental deterioration.   
 
It is important however that such an evolution be grounded not only on the respect for 
international law and the commitment to strengthen international cooperation under 
the multilateral system, but also on the perception of fairness, justice and morality, 
which would ultimately mean that the rules apply to all member states.  The double 
standard will become hardly acceptable under the prevailing circumstances of this 
first decade of the 21
st
 century.  
 
The record of the Security Council in relation to the principle of legality might be 
considered to reduce the urgency of any judicial review by the ICJ or a political 
review by the General Assembly. Yet the terms of the charter increasingly fail to 
provide legal certainty as to the range of situations covered by the powers of the 
Security Council. As a matter of fact, legislative resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 
(2004) threaten further to de-legitimise the Council as they contradict the basic 
premises of international law-making.  
 
Within the realities of international relations, the Security Council should reclaim its 
status, as the representative of the international community in order to deal with the 
new threats, dangers and moral imperatives that have been identified since 1990. 
However, it is questionable whether the existing legal framework of the Charter, as 
interpreted through Security Council practice and debate, can meet those challenges in 
a legitimate and legal way.  
 
If a hegemonic state distorts multilateralism and uses intergovernmental organizations 
to unilaterally pursue its interests through these mechanisms, it will impair their 
credibility, legitimacy, and functioning as global institutions. There is a growing 
unease about the extent to which the Security Council agenda is being dominated by 
the most powerful member states and translated into military action. 
 
The launching of a UN authorized humanitarian intervention against the wishes of the 
legitimate governments of member States constitute grave precedents. International 
organizations may be viewed more as a threat to the security of many countries than 
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as a source of protection against major-power actions. The allegedly moral 
predicament of the ―right to protect‖ is being jeopardised by ambiguity and selectivity 
as in 2009 international conflicts are being witnessed involving serious humanitarian 
crisis.   
 
Since the Second World War, the legitimization of the use of force by multilateral 
institutions such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has 
been an important historic evolution. Multilateral forces seem to be moving from a 
traditional peace-keepeng position into a peace-enforcement mode among the warring 
parties. However, the strengthening of the role of international institutions will largely 
depend on a coherent vision of justice, morality, legitimacy and consistency.  
 
Despite the end of the Cold War, the continuous expansion of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization raises questions about the threats which would justify it. Is the 
enlargement process in itself a threat to disarmament and larger global cooperation? 
Does History justifies the concern of those who would still recognize in NATO a 
military alliance of former colonial owners responsible for artificially carving up Asia 
and Africa. Policies of divide, conquer and leave are still alive, if not in the memories 
of old people at least in the pages of History books. The consistence in the upholding 
of values and principles is important to ascertain these noble purposes and 
differentiate them from self-interest and expediency. 
 
Since the establishment of the United Nations a new paradigm has been slowly 
emerging to become a strong and, possibly, a prevalent factor in international 
relations during the 21
st
 century. Individual interests would cease to predominate and 
be subject to a broader international scrutiny coming from a more democratic global 
society formed by nation states and international organizations, both governmental 
and non-governmental. Respect for human rights, including the right to development, 
for a sustainable global environment, for transparency and democratic accountability 
and a broadened definition of the concept of security would ultimately prevail. 
 
International control over the use of force must be exercised by the Security Council, 
an organ that suffers from a deficit of legitimacy. The Security Council authority, 
which is based on the consent of all member states of the United Nations, must be 
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fully restored and respected. Yet, a critical issue is whether the authority of the 
Council can be sustained indefinitely if the unrepresentative allocation of power to the 
present Permanent Members remains unchanged and prevents a more rule based 
international system.  
 
The expanding powers of the Security Council can be either an enhancement or a 
challenge to the rule of law and legitimacy in international relations. It will all depend 
on the Council‘s capacity to adjust to the realities and expectations of the new 
millennium. With the spread and the strengthening of democracy, international 
community cannot evolve independently of a growing urge for fairness and 
representation in international decision making in matters as serious as a threat or a 
breach of peace and security and enforcement actions under Chapter Seven of the UN 
Charter.   
 
 
    ------------------- 
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